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       Steven L. Schwarcz2 
 
Abstract:  This article attempts to explain empirically the value that 
lawyers add when acting as counsel to parties in business transactions. 
Contrary to existing scholarship, which is based mostly on theory, this 
article shows that transactional lawyers add value primarily by reducing 
regulatory costs, thereby challenging the reigning models of transactional 
lawyers as “transaction cost engineers” and “reputational 
intermediaries.” This new model not only helps inform contract theory but 
also reveals a profoundly different vision than those of existing models for 
the future of legal education and the profession.  
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 Everyone understands the value of lawyers as litigators, but for decades scholars 
have attempted to explain what value lawyers add in their quintessential role as counsel 
to parties in the negotiating, contract drafting, and opinion-giving process3 leading to 
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“closing”4 a commercial, financing, or other business transaction (lawyers performing 
this role being referred to hereinafter as “transactional lawyers” or “transactional 
counsel”5).6 To date,  however, the scholarship reflects mostly pure theory, occasionally 
tempered by isolated anecdotes.7 Perhaps as a result, its findings are both overly broad 
and incomplete. 
 
 Professors Gilson, Mnookin, and Gardner argue, for example, that transactional 
lawyers add value primarily by reducing transaction costs, acting as reputational 
intermediaries, anticipating and counseling clients about risks and outcomes, identifying 
differences in valuation between parties, and creating economies of scope.8 To a large 
                                                 
4 A “closing” is the final stage of a business transaction when the documents and 
agreements are signed (and, as appropriate, filed with requisite government agencies) and 
the transaction is then funded or otherwise effectuated. 
5 This article focuses on external, as opposed to in-house, transactional lawyers—that is, 
transactional lawyers within independent law firms. Although law firms continue to 
dominate sophisticated transactional work (see Appendix A, infra, at B.3, indicating that 
most clients seriously consider hiring law firms for transactions that are complex, 
unusual, or involve large dollar amounts), in-house legal departments in recent years have 
grown in reputation and skill. The value provided by in-house lawyers as transactional 
counsel, and the extent to which that value might be different from the value provided by 
external transactional lawyers, are possible issues for further study. Cf. Appendix A, 
infra, at B.1 (showing that transactional lawyers have a somewhat higher opinion than 
clients of the extent to which a highly reputed law firm contributes to the success of a 
transaction, perhaps indicating that general counsel with confidence in their own staff do 
not see as much of a need to hire high reputation firms for transactional work). See also 
Steven L. Schwarcz, “To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation” 
(Jan. 29, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).   
6 Cf. Ronald Gilson, 2 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 509 
(Peter Newman, ed. 1998) (focusing on “lawyers providing non-litigation services to 
clients engaged in business activities”). Any value that transactional lawyers may provide 
as litigation counsel is beyond this article’s scope.  
7 The seminal work is Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills 
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L. J. 239 (1984). See also Seminar, Business Lawyers and 
Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1 et seq. (1995). 
8 See Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 242; Peter J. Gardner, 
A Role for the Business Attorney in the Twenty-First Century: Adding Value to the 
Client’s Enterprise in the Knowledge Economy, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 17, 39 
(2003); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value 
Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (1995). 
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extent, however—as Professor Gilson himself acknowledges9—this represents the same 
types of value that could be added in business transactions by any sophisticated 
negotiating party, not necessarily one specially trained as a lawyer.10 For example, as key 
players in most business transactions, investment bankers appear equally capable of 
identifying differences in valuation between parties, reducing transaction costs, acting as 
reputational intermediaries, anticipating (at least non-legal) risks and outcomes, and 
developing economies of scope.11 Unless transactional lawyers add significant value in 
their capacity as lawyers, their utility would be questionable if not fungible. 
 
 This article challenges existing scholarship by attempting to discover empirically 
what value transactional lawyers actually provide. The empirical findings suggest that 
transactional lawyers create significant value in their capacity as lawyers in ways that 
have been underestimated by scholars and that may have profound significance to the 
future of the profession and of legal education. 
 
 METHODOLOGY  
 The article utilizes quantitative data to test a range of hypotheses, including 
hypotheses advanced under the existing scholarship, about how transactional lawyers in 
law firms might provide value.12 These data derive from the results of e-mail surveys 
                                                 
9 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 295 (“There is nothing 
traditionally ‘legal’ about the role I have described business lawyers as playing, nor are 
there any special requirements peculiar to lawyers necessary to play this role.”). See also 
Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 44–45 (1995) 
(proposing alternatives to lawyers as reputational intermediaries). 
10 Though anticipating risks and outcomes is a uniquely lawyerly role to the extent it 
involves anticipating legal risks and outcomes.  
11 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 616–21 (1984) (describing the role of the investment banker in 
distributing securities). 
12 See supra note 5 (noting this article’s focus on independent, as opposed to in-house, 
transactional lawyers). The focus on law firms means that the transactions at issue will 
tend to be those that are complex, unusual, or involve large dollar amounts. Cf. infra note 
16 (indicating the practice areas examined). 
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with transactional lawyers and their clients.13 The surveys were conducted using four-
page questionnaires, one prepared for lawyers and a slightly modified version prepared 
for clients.14 The client questionnaires served as a control, to help reveal any areas where 
lawyer perceptions of their value might not be shared by clients and thus might be 
inaccurate.  
 
 The lawyer questionnaire included twenty-six questions, and the client 
questionnaire twenty-seven questions, in each case divided into sections based on the 
hypotheses discussed below.15 Forms of these questionnaires are annexed as Addenda 1 
(Lawyer Questionnaire) and 2 (Client Questionnaire). The lawyer questionnaire was sent 
to a representative sampling of transactional lawyers,16 and the client questionnaire was 
sent to a representative sampling of clients.17 Approximately eight percent of these 
lawyers and four percent of these clients responded.18  
                                                 
13 Cf. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) 
(observing that empirical data “may be … the results of interviews or surveys”). 
14 See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 37-56 and accompanying text. 
16 Lawyer questionnaires were sent to 500 lawyers in New York City, 211 lawyers in 
Philadelphia, and 270 lawyers in Chicago, cities selected to represent major and regional 
money centers in the United States. Respondents were selected randomly using a random 
number generator from a list of lawyers generated from the LexisNexis® Martindale-
Hubbell® Lawyer Locator. See Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study 
of Lawyer Response to Clients Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 107-
11 (1994) (using a similar sampling method). To qualify to receive a survey, the lawyer 
must concentrate the majority of his or her practice in corporate transactional work 
(including mergers and acquisitions (M&A), securities law, corporate finance, project 
finance, or structured finance) and be a partner or counsel at a law firm with at least fifty 
lawyers that is listed in the NALP DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS. 
17 We initially e-mailed client questionnaires to the general counsel at 165 financial 
services or Fortune 500 companies. Some additional responses were obtained by e-
mailing client questionnaires to former clients of the author and to Duke Law School 
alumni working at companies. The relevant text of the e-mail to which all questionnaires 
were attached is as follows: “[W]e have attached a short (4-page) questionnaire, which 
should take only a few minutes to complete. We would be grateful for your response or, 
if you prefer, the response of a colleague (or colleagues) in the legal department. The 
transactional areas on which we are focusing are securities offerings, M&A, commercial 
lending, and structured and project finance. / In addition, it would be especially useful to 
ascertain whether non-lawyers at your company have different perspectives on how law 
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 The hypotheses tested by these questionnaires are intended to represent all 
plausible hypotheses for how transactional lawyers might add value.19 This article does 
not assume, however, that transactional lawyers in fact add value; it merely asks—if they 
do—how would that value be supplied? 
 
 This begs the questions: What constitutes value, and value to whom? By “value,” 
this article essentially means monetary value.20 This would include not only lowering 
direct costs but also indirectly saving costs, such as reducing the time and effort that 
parties need to devote to a business transaction.21 Value also may include less tangible 
(and thus less quantifiable) factors, such as employing an experienced lawyer to increase 
client confidence and reduce anxiety.  
 
 As to the second question (value to whom?), the most obvious potential recipient 
of value is the client. For this reason, as well as to serve as a control,22 the article also 
surveys clients of transactional lawyers. The article takes a broad societal perspective, 
however, and does not focus on value creation from the standpoint of any single client. 
                                                                                                                                                 
firms add value in business transactions. We therefore would appreciate your sharing the 
questionnaire with one or more of your non-legal colleagues who work closely with 
outside counsel in the transactional areas mentioned above, and would be grateful for 
their responses.” 
18 There were 75 lawyer responses to 981 solicitations, and 17 client responses to 427 
solicitations. The lower “client” response rate as well as the fact that some of those 
responses included former clients of the author or Duke Law School alumni (see supra 
note 17) make the client responses less random, and thus arguably less reliable, than the 
lawyer responses. 
19 See infra notes 23-37 and accompanying text (setting forth these hypotheses and 
explaining their derivation).  
20 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 243 (arguing that if a 
transactional lawyer adds value, the transaction must be worth more, net of legal fees, as 
a result of the lawyer’s participation). Cf. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 10 (2d ed. 1977) (defining value as “human satisfaction as measured by aggregate 
consumer willingness to pay for goods and services”). 
21 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 254 (equating “cost-
saving” with “value creation”). 
22 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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Even if a clever lawyer is able to negotiate a better deal for her client than a less clever 
lawyer can negotiate for his, that would not increase but would merely reallocate overall 
value in a zero-sum game.23 
 
 The foregoing methodology, of course, has potential flaws. Although they 
constitute “a primary source of data in . . .  the social sciences,”24 surveys have inherent 
limitations, such as being dependent on the precise wording, format, and context of the 
survey questions.25 Survey data also indicate, in this case, what transactional lawyers and 
their clients say the former do, which may be different from what transactional lawyers 
actually do. Transactional lawyers, for example, may view their roles as more important 
and indispensable than they actually are.26 
 
 For survey purposes, the article also treats the general counsel—or, where 
applicable, a person to whom the general counsel forwards the survey to respond—as a 
proxy for the client-company, even though non-lawyers sometimes might have different 
views of how transactional lawyers add value in business transactions. This was done 
because initial research indicated that non-lawyer clients would be very unlikely to 
respond directly to the questionnaires. All general counsel were asked, however, to share 
the questionnaire with one or more of their non-legal colleagues who work closely with 
                                                 
23 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 244-45. This article 
therefore does not examine the allocative role of transactional lawyers to try to get their 
clients the greatest slice of the value “pie.” 
24 Norbert Schwarz, Self Reports: How the Questions Shape the Answers, 54 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGISt 93, 93 (Feb. 1999). 
25 Id. (observing that surveys are a “fallible source of data [in that] minor changes in 
question wording, question format, or question context can result in major changes in the 
obtained results”). 
26 See, e.g., Robert E. Rosen, “We’re All Consultants Now”: How Change in Client 
Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal 
Services, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 638 (2002) (“The self-reports of elite actors, like lawyers, 
are especially suspect, for often they are speeches to an audience (other than the 
interviewer).”); Robert K. Rasmussen, Lawyers, Law and Contract Formation, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 2748, 2749-50 (2000) (discussing this tendency from the standpoint of lawyer 
self-reporting). 
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outside counsel in the transactional areas of interest, in order to ascertain whether non-
lawyers have different perspectives on how such counsel add value.27 
 
 Furthermore, the low response rates to the questionnaires28 may signal potential 
biases, since “nonresponse often is not random.”29 For example, the transactional lawyers 
who responded may have been more intellectually curious about this project than non-
respondents; or those respondents may have been, on average, less busy—and therefore 
perhaps less competent lawyers—than non-respondents. Without denying the possibility 
of some such bias, the relatively small deviations in the lawyer-respondents’ answers and 
the high degree of correlation among this survey’s city-by-city data mitigated somewhat 
against the existence of bias.30 Moreover, transactional lawyers tend to be extremely 
busy, and the author’s expectations going into this project was that response rates would 
not exceed 10%—remarkably close to the actual response rate.31  
 
 Because of these and other potential limitations,32 this article occasionally 
attempts to explain and add perspective to the quantitative data by utilizing qualitative 
data in the form of “evidence about the world [of transactional lawyering] based on 
                                                 
27 See supra note 17. 
28 See text accompanying note 18, supra, indicating approximate response rates of eight 
percent for lawyers and four percent for clients.  
29 See generally Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 229, 245 (2d ed. 2000) (Fed. Jud. Center). 
30 The uniformity of these data do not, of course, rule out the possibility that all 
respondents were similarly biased.   
31 Although the client sampling was theoretically biased in that no attempt was made to 
distinguish clients who use lawyers for transactional work and clients who do not 
(indeed, all client respondents fell into the first category), any such bias should be 
minimal since the types of corporate transactional work this article examines (see supra 
note 16) almost always involves lawyers. 
32 See supra note 18 (observing potential limitations in the client responses). Other 
potential limitations to this article’s methodology include that transactional lawyers were 
identified through the imprecise practice-area categories in Martindale-Hubbell (see 
supra note 16, listing those categories as M&A, securities law, corporate finance, project 
finance, and structured finance), and that law firms and clients were matched, based on 
these listings, using educated guesses.  
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observation [and] experience,”33 deriving largely from the author’s twenty-two years of 
observations and experiences as a transactional lawyer.34 The use of qualitative data is 
equally “empirical” as the use of quantitative data.35 
 
 The results of the survey data are consistent with these observations and 
experiences, indicating such data do indeed show what transactional lawyers actually do. 
This is not to say that these results are infallible, merely that—because a “truly empirical 
approach to measuring the impact of a business lawyer’s participation seems 
impossible”36—survey results may be as close a proxy as feasible to showing what 
transactional lawyers actually do.  
 
 HYPOTHESES 
 In accordance with the foregoing methodology, this article tests the hypotheses 
that transactional lawyers add value by (1) minimizing the potential for ex post litigation; 
(2) reducing transaction costs; (3) reducing regulatory costs37; (4) acting as reputational 
intermediaries; (5) providing client privilege and confidentiality; (6) creating economies 
of scope. These hypotheses—representing what appears to be all plausible hypotheses for 
how transactional lawyers might add value—were compiled from scholarly literature, 
practitioner literature, transactional lawyer feedback on draft questionnaires, and 
experience. None of these hypotheses is necessarily mutually exclusive of others. To the 
                                                 
33 See Epstein & King, The Rules of Inference, supra note 13, at 2 (observing that 
“empirical research, as natural and social scientists recognize, … denotes [not only 
quantitative data but also] evidence about the world based on observation or 
experience”). 
34 The author represented clients in transactions involving corporate finance, structured 
finance, and securities law from 1974 through 1989 as an associate and then partner at the 
law firm of Shearman & Sterling and from 1989 through 1996 as partner and chairman of 
the Structured Finance Practice Group at the Kaye Scholer law firm.  
35 Epstein & King, The Rules of Inference, supra note 13, at 2 (observing that “neither 
[quantitative nor qualitative observation about the world] is any more ‘empirical’ than the 
other”). 
36 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 247-48. 
37 In conversations with the author, Professor Victor Fleischer has referred to at least an 
aspect of this function of lawyers as “regulatory cost engineering.” 
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extent transactional lawyers add value, they might do so through a combination of these 
hypotheses.  
 
 Each of these hypotheses is further explained below.  
 
 1. The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by minimizing the 
potential for ex post litigation.  This hypothesis predicts that lawyers add value to 
transactions by anticipating and minimizing the likelihood that failure of the transaction 
will result in litigation.  
 
 2. The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by reducing transaction 
costs.  Under this hypothesis, transactional lawyers reduce certain transaction costs, 
thereby increasing the size of the pie for all parties.38 They reduce moral hazard, for 
example, by drafting transaction documents and agreements to eliminate adverse actions 
due to changes in incentives. Thus, if the purchase price of a capital asset in an M&A 
transaction is adjusted based on buyer’s revenues in the year following the sale, the 
seller’s transactional lawyer could negotiate and draft the contract so as to eliminate the 
buyer’s incentive to increase current costs (and thereby adjust the purchase price 
downward).39 This hypothesis also predicts that transactional lawyers reduce agency 
costs by implicitly monitoring (as independent advocates for their client’s position) that 
their client’s officers act on the client’s behalf40 and that they effectively reduce 
asymmetric information by giving legal opinions.41 
 
                                                 
38 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 246. Professor Gilson 
refers to lawyers acting in this capacity as “transaction cost engineers.” Id. at 253-55. 
39 Id. at 255. 
40 Cf. id. at 292, 298. 
41 Id. at 275, 291-92 (arguing that, in M&A transactions, transactional lawyers use their 
position as third-party intermediaries in a repeat-transactional world to give detached 
opinions on the state of the capital changing hands). 
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 Although complying with law might be broadly viewed as a cost of engaging in a 
transaction, the relevant literature does not generally include legal compliance as a 
transaction cost.42 It is therefore discussed as a separate hypothesis, below. 
 
 3. The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by reducing regulatory 
costs.  In its narrow form, this hypothesis predicts that transactional lawyers add value by 
understanding their clients’ regulatory concerns, thereby being able to negotiate deals 
without compromising regulatory compliance.43 This “client-regulatory” legal work 
involves understanding the law and regulation that bind the client, qua client.  
  
 Because most clients, just like most companies, are not highly regulated (if 
regulated at all),44 this article posits a broader hypothesis, distinguishing between client-
regulatory legal work and “transaction-regulatory” legal work. Transaction-regulatory 
legal work involves understanding the law and regulation that govern the particular type 
of transaction, irrespective of the regulatory concerns of the client engaging in the 
transaction. As an example of this distinction, consider a typical legal opinion, 
concluding (among other things) that an agreement is enforceable according to its terms 
and that performance thereof would not violate law.45 In rendering this opinion, 
transactional counsel would be performing client-regulatory legal work to the extent 
counsel’s conclusion goes to no violation of law, and would be performing transaction-
regulatory legal work to the extent the conclusion goes to enforceability of the agreement 
qua agreement.  
 
                                                 
42 See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.  
43 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 6 (asserting 
that transactional lawyers “must play an important role in designing the structure of the 
transaction in order to assure the desired regulatory treatment”). 
44 See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
45 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 
84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 35-36 & 55-56 (2005). See also infra note 81 and accompanying text 
(discussing legal opinions). 
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 Whereas literature to date examines only client-regulatory legal work, this article 
also examines transaction-regulatory legal work as a possible source of transactional 
lawyer value.  
 
 4. The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by acting as reputational 
intermediaries.  Under this hypothesis, as repeat players in the transactional world, 
transactional lawyers add value by renting their good reputation to clients. If, for 
example, a particular law firm is well known for representing underwriters selling 
securities, the hypothesis predicts that underwriter-clients, by using that firm, signal a 
measure of reliability and soundness to potential investors in those securities. The high-
reputation law firm not only has expertise but, more importantly, bonds itself to good 
performance; it would lose at least part of its reputation if it failed to perform well. In this 
regard, reputation appears to be a more effective “bond” than liability because 
professional negligence is hard to prove46 and, when proved, is usually covered by 
insurance.47 The hypothesis also predicts that hiring a high-reputation law firm adds even 
greater value when the client does not already have a high reputation (e.g., is not a repeat 
player) in a type of transaction. 
 
 This hypothesis appears to be the most agreed upon scholarly theory of the value 
added by transactional lawyers.48 
 
                                                 
46 See, e.g., Krista M. Enns, Note, Can A California Litigant Prevail in an Action for 
Legal Malpractice Based on an Attorney’s Oral Argument Before the United States 
Supreme Court?, 48 DUKE L.J. 111, 146 (1998) (arguing that in legal malpractice actions 
“causation is so difficult to prove that litigants are likely to fail”); John H. Bauman, 
Damages For Legal Malpractice: An Appraisal Of The Crumbling Dike And The 
Threatening Flood, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1127, 1129 (1988). 
47 Although law firms presumably could make liability more of a “bond” by taking high 
insurance deductibles and advertising that to potential clients, one does not observe this 
in practice. Cf. Robert Ceniceros, Third-party Liability Threat to Lawyers Grows, BUS. 
INS., Nov. 14, 2005 at 16 (observing that law firms disfavor high insurance deductibles 
and accept such deductibles only where forced to do so by insurance market constraints). 
48 See e.g., Gardner, A Role for the Business Attorney in the Twenty-First Century, supra 
note 8, at 46-48; Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, supra note 9, at 43.  
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 5.  The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by providing client 
privilege and confidentiality.  According to this hypothesis, lawyers add value by 
providing clients with a measure of privilege and confidentiality. Clients gain these 
protections through the attorney-client privilege: a lawyer’s work product, including 
correspondence with clients in preparing for a deal, may be privileged under applicable 
state law.49 Thus, a client may be able to communicate through its lawyers without 
revealing confidential matters to opposing parties.   
 
 6.  The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by creating economies of 
scope.  Economies of scope represent the savings resulting from having the same 
investment support multiple profitable activities less expensively in combination than 
separately.50 Because transactional lawyers already play a legal role in transactions, this 
hypothesis predicts that “economies of scope should give them an advantage in 
performing the [non-legal] aspects of transaction structuring as well.”51  
 
 According to this hypothesis, non-legal jobs include negotiation and drafting of 
deal documentation, identifying differences in valuation, reducing transaction costs, and 
engaging in due diligence. This hypothesis predicts, for example, that although a non-
lawyer scrivener could instead negotiate and draft deal documentation, a lawyer would 
still be needed to review the documentation from a legal standpoint. Having the 
reviewing lawyer also do the negotiation and drafting creates the economy of scope. 
 
 In examining this hypothesis, it is important to distinguish economies of scope 
from economies of scale. The latter represents the savings resulting from the greater 
                                                 
49 See Brian E. Hamilton, Conflict, Disparity, and Indecision: The Unsettled Corporate 
Attorney-Client Privilege, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 629, 633-49 (1997) (giving a state by 
state look at the corporate attorney-client privilege, and noting the uncertainty of the 
contours of the privilege in most states). 
50 CAMPBELL R. HARVEY, HYPERTEXTUAL FINANCE GLOSSARY, available at 
http://www.duke.edu/~charvey/Classes/wpg/bfglose.htm (visited Nov. 23, 2005). 
51 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note  7, at 298. 
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efficiency of large-scale processes.52 Transactional lawyers can and do create economies 
of scale, such as by counseling multiple transactions of a given type, thereby 
apportioning the cost of gaining experience and expertise. Although that adds value, it is 
not value that is unique to transactional lawyering: any party who advises on multiple 
transactions of a given type could add similar value. For that reason, and since economies 
of scale are not singled out in the literature as a source of transactional lawyer value, this 
article does not separately test whether transactional lawyers add value by creating 
economies of scale. To some extent, however, that value is implicit in certain of this 
article’s other hypotheses. For example, transactional lawyers should better perform 
transaction-regulatory legal work by counseling multiple transactions, should better 
perform client-regulatory legal work by counseling multiple clients subject to the same 
regulatory framework, and should be better reputational intermediaries by engaging in 
repeat transactions.    
 
 More marginal ways in which transactional lawyers may add value.  In addition 
to the foregoing hypotheses, transactional lawyers may add value in more marginal ways. 
From a behavioral-psychology standpoint, for example, transactional lawyers—by 
training if not also by the temperament of many who go into the legal profession, 
especially those who avoid being litigators—are likely to be more risk averse than their 
business clients.53 These lawyers therefore may provide a sounding board to help clients 
balance risk-prone ideas. Transactional lawyers also might add value by enhancing the 
perception of social ordering: society has a fundamental need for order, and lawyers are 
the priests who provide the order through law, granting confidence and authority to 
transactions. 54 Transactional lawyers additionally can add value to the client by 
                                                 
52 HARVEY, HYPERTEXTUAL FINANCE GLOSSARY, supra note 50. 
53 See, e.g., Susan R. Helper, Symposium, Governing Alliances: Advancing Knowledge 
and Controlling Opportunism, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 929, 931 (2003) (arguing 
lawyers and economists are both very “risk averse”); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. 
Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. 
CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 375, 379 (1997) (predicting “systematic overstatement of risk is a 
robust, if not universal, phenomenon in the legal profession”). 
54 For example, the Noachide laws commanded mankind to establish courts of justice and 
a just social order. See Babylonian Talmud, Baba Bathra 22b, translated in Babylonian 
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providing a measure of risk-shifting, in that the client might have a claim against the 
lawyer if the transaction results in losses. Any such claim would succeed, however, only 
if the lawyer was negligent in failing to protect against the losses, and clients should be 
able to insure more efficiently in other ways against bad outcomes.55 Furthermore, this 
reallocation in overall value is not the type of value on which this article focuses.56 
 
 This article tests only the first six hypotheses. It does not systematically attempt to 
test the more marginal ways in which transactional lawyers might add value.57  
 
 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 Set forth below are this article’s empirical findings. The data underlying these 
findings are presented in detail in Appendix A.58 As the analysis shows, these findings 
contrast starkly in many cases with scholarly theory.   
 
 1. Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by 
minimizing the potential for ex post litigation.  The findings partly support the first 
hypothesis, that transactional lawyers add value by minimizing the potential for ex post 
litigation. Most lawyer-respondents and client-respondents agree that this is one of the 
primary goals that lawyers drafting contracts should seek to accomplish.59 Still, litigation 
is so rare that this role of lawyers might appear to add relatively modest value. On 
                                                                                                                                                 
Talmud, Baba Bathra 22b (I. Epstein trans. & ed., 1960); see also Rene David, Two 
Conceptions of Social Order, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 136, 140 (1983). 
55 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 (2000). 
56 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
57 Thus, although the data in Appendix A hereto, at C.8, indicate that clients do not 
significantly look to transactional lawyers for third-party objectivity, such data do not 
systematically probe whether clients use such lawyers as sounding boards to help balance 
risk-prone ideas.  
58 Appendix A does not break down the data as among the categories of corporate 
transactional work (M&A, securities law, corporate finance, project finance, and 
structured finance) because the responses as among those categories were not statistically 
significant. See “Practice Area Data” memorandum from Casey Dwyer to the author 
(April 20, 2006) (on file with author).  
59 Appendix A, at A.1. 
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average, both lawyer-respondents and client-respondents said that only about two percent 
of contracts actually end up in litigation.60  
 
 Litigation may be rare, of course, precisely because transactional lawyers are 
effectively minimizing the potential for ex post litigation. Indeed, over three-quarters of 
the lawyer-respondents and almost two-thirds of the client-respondents felt that contracts 
drafted by lawyers are much less likely to end up in litigation than contracts drafted by 
non-lawyers.61 That explanation, however, is belied to some extent by the fact that what 
is litigated is often so different from what anyone negotiating the contract anticipated.62 
Almost half of all lawyer-respondents, and two-thirds of client-respondents, said that 
none or at most only some63 of the issues over which contracts were litigated were 
anticipated during negotiation.64 Furthermore, none of the lawyer-respondents regarded 
“protecting [the] client from future litigation” as the sole primary goal of contracting.65 
Although most lawyer-respondents saw that protection as an important goal,66 the only 
                                                 
60 See Appendix A, at A.2. 
61 Appendix A, at A.4. 
62 One could argue, of course, that the fact that what is litigated is often so different from 
what anyone negotiating the contract anticipated just goes to show that, when lawyers 
anticipate issues, they are able to avoid litigation (although the reality is that there are 
always unanticipated issues, and these are the issues that are most often litigated). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests this argument would be incomplete, however. See infra note 
68 and accompanying text (suggesting that money disputes often trigger litigation 
regardless of the contract terms). 
63 By “some,” I mean between zero and forty percent. 
64 Appendix A, at A.3. These data were unusually “lumpy.” For example, when asked 
whether contracts are litigated over issues that were anticipated during negotiation, a 
quarter of the lawyer-respondents said that none of those issues were anticipated, 
approximately a quarter said that 41-60% of those issues were anticipated, while the 
remaining lawyer-respondents gave answers that appear randomly strewn in the other 
percentage categories. Id. This diverse range may well reflect that individual 
transactional lawyers see their limited experience as representative, extrapolating from 
inadequate data. One way to meaningfully interpret these data, however, may be to view 
them in the aggregate. From that perspective, approximately 43% of contracts on average 
are litigated over issues that were anticipated during negotiation. Id. 
65 Appendix A, at A.1. 
66 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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sole primary goal they identified was creating a roadmap for the parties to follow in their 
ongoing relationship.67 
 
 This suggests that the most valuable contracts might be those that 
straightforwardly describe the basic business understanding. Anecdotal evidence supports 
this view, suggesting that contracts may have less to do with avoiding litigation per se 
and more to do about setting forth a basic business understanding, and that money 
disputes often trigger litigation regardless of the contract terms.68 Thus, although 
avoiding litigation is an important consideration, it may be more of a secondary 
consideration.69  
 
 These findings call into question the oft-seen assumption of contract theory that 
lawyers add value to the contracting process primarily by minimizing the potential for ex 
post litigation.70 This in turn calls into question, at least in a business law context, 
contract-theory scholarship based on that assumption. In its place, the findings suggest 
the possibility of a modified paradigm for business law contracting: primarily to provide 
a roadmap for the parties to follow in their ongoing relationship, and secondarily to 
minimize the potential for ex post litigation. To some extent these goals are related, in 
that a clear roadmap minimizes the potential for litigation. Additionally, however, a clear 
                                                 
67 Appendix A, at A.1 (indicating that 9.3% of lawyer-respondents see this as their sole 
primary goal when drafting a contract). 
68 Comments of Stanley Star, Principal of Star Management Inc., to the author’s class, 
Principles of Commercial & Bankruptcy Law (Nov. 4, 2005). 
69 Although 11.8% of the client-respondents did see protection from future litigation as 
the sole primary goal that lawyers drafting contracts should seek to accomplish (see 
Appendix A, at A.1), that disparity from the lawyer-survey findings may reflect that 
clients hire lawyers for result-oriented reasons, whereas lawyers view their role as more 
process oriented—in this case, to set forth a roadmap for the parties to follow in order to 
achieve, among other things, protection of the client from future litigation. 
70 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract 
Design, 115 YALE L. J. 814 (2006) (assuming this as the primary goal of contracting). 
See also Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Contingency and Contracts: A Philosophy of Complex 
Business Transactions, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1077 (2005) (generally addressing the 
lawyer’s role in contracts to minimize and prepare for future contingencies, including the 
potential for litigation). 
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roadmap not only documents the basic business understanding but also minimizes the 
potential for ex post disputes that do not rise to the level of litigation.  
 
 Minimizing the potential for ex post litigation, and arguably also the potential for 
non-litigated disputes, has been viewed so far as a discrete hypothesis. Conceptually, 
however, it is more logically viewed (and will be discussed here) as a subset of the next 
two hypotheses: reducing transaction costs and reducing regulatory costs. It is a subset of 
the former to the extent transactional lawyers help avoid business issues—and a subset of 
the latter to the extent transactional lawyers help avoid legal issues—that result in 
litigation and other disputes.  
 
 2. Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by 
reducing transaction costs.  The findings weakly support the second hypothesis, that 
transactional lawyers add value by reducing transaction costs (namely by reducing moral 
hazard by drafting transaction documents and agreements to eliminate adverse actions 
due to a change in incentives; by reducing agency costs by implicitly monitoring, as 
independent advocates for their client’s position, that their client’s officers act on the 
client’s behalf; and by effectively reducing asymmetric information by giving legal 
opinions71).  
 
 Although most lawyers and clients felt that transactional counsel should be 
somewhat responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect the client against, possible 
future events that could change the client’s business incentives,72 far fewer thought such 
counsel should be responsible for anticipating or drafting to protect the client against 
possible future events that could change the business incentives of other transaction 
                                                 
71 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
72 Appendix A, at E.2. 
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parties.73 Furthermore, relatively few lawyers and far fewer clients felt that transactional 
counsel monitor the client’s officers to any significant extent.74 
 
 Perhaps it is not surprising that transactional lawyers in fact add relatively little 
value in these ways. There is nothing per se “legal” about the role of transactional 
lawyers in reducing moral hazard; sophisticated non-lawyer scriveners also could 
anticipate moral hazard and draft to avoid it, such as by negotiating and drafting an M&A 
contract to eliminate a buyer’s incentive to increase current costs and thereby adjust a 
deferred purchase price downward.75 Nor is there anything per se legal about the role of 
transactional lawyers in agency cost monitoring, a job that independent non-lawyers 
could likewise perform.76 Indeed, Professor Gilson himself has recognized that non-
lawyers could—and to some extent probably do—perform these functions as well as and 
at lower cost than lawyers.77  
 
 The only example in the scholarly literature of transactional lawyers using their 
legal skills to reduce transaction costs is through giving legal opinions to reduce 
asymmetric information between transaction parties.78 Legal opinions are  
 
informed judgments, usually in writing, given by lawyers on issues of law. 
Although legal opinions are sometimes directed to clients, in a 
transactional setting legal opinions are often provided, at the request of 
                                                 
73 Appendix A, at E.3. 
74 Appendix A, at E.4 (showing that only a third of lawyer-respondents monitor to a 
significant or greater extent that their client’s officers act on the client’s behalf, and that 
less than a fifth of client-respondents (6.3% ÷ 33.3%) perceive even that limited 
monitoring). 
75 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (using this example of moral hazard). 
76 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (showing that transactional lawyers do not 
perform this monitoring to any significant extent). 
77 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 254 n. 39, 298-299, & 
300-01. But cf. infra notes 119-130 and accompanying text (discussing whether 
transactional lawyers could reduce these costs more efficiently than non-lawyers due to 
economies of scope). 
78 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 312. 
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clients, to or for the benefit of third parties such as financiers of credit or 
investors.79 
 
Third parties commonly require legal opinions as a condition precedent to closing 
business transactions to help assure that, at least insofar as those parties have 
requested opinion coverage, nothing legally problematic lurks beneath the 
transaction’s surface.80 Lawyers providing the opinion apply applicable law to the 
transaction’s particular facts in order to reach their legal conclusions. Their 
inability to deliver a requested opinion at closing signals a problem, allowing 
intended opinion recipients to refuse to consummate the transaction.81   
 
 The survey findings suggest, however, that opinion-giving by transactional 
lawyers may be relatively insignificant. Although time spent does not necessarily 
correlate to value provided, only a small fraction—five to fifteen percent—of a 
transactional lawyer’s work is involved with issuing legal opinions.82 Moreover, opinion-
giving fits uneasily into the second hypothesis. The argument for its fit is that it reduces 
transaction costs by reducing information asymmetry.83 But it can be misleading to say 
that legal opinions reduce information asymmetry since “recipients of [legal] opinions 
often have the same factual information that opining counsel has.”84 Legal opinions 
actually work in a more limited sense—by applying applicable law to those facts in order 
                                                 
79 The Limits of Lawyering, supra note 45, at 9. 
80 Id. at 10. 
81 Id. at 10-11. For a more complete discussion of legal-opinion practice, see Jonathan C. 
Lipson, Path & Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A 
Preliminary Investigation), 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 59 (2005). 
82 Appendix A, at E.1. 
83 See supra note 78. 
84 The Limits of Lawyering, supra note 45, at 10 n.54. Cf. Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. 
Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes 
in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 694-95 (1996) (arguing, in the context of 
start-up transactions in Silicon Valley, that legal opinions add little informational value). 
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to reach legal conclusions85—and even then the “[r]ecipient’s counsel is likely to have 
the same ability to apply the law to facts as opining counsel.”86  
 
 Opinion-giving does, however, fit more naturally into the next hypothesis, that 
transactional lawyers add value by reducing regulatory costs—by assessing the legal 
consequences of the transaction for the parties receiving the opinion.87 
 
 3. Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by 
reducing regulatory costs.  The findings strongly support the third hypothesis, that 
transactional lawyers add value by reducing regulatory costs.88 Over ninety-three percent 
of transactional lawyers said their transactional work involves law to a “significant” or 
“great” extent.89 Although that percentage may to some extent reflect a self-reporting 
bias,90 the findings were largely confirmed by client respondents.91 These findings differ 
significantly from the predictions of existing theoretical literature that transactional 
lawyers add value mostly in ways that do not necessarily require legal training.92   
 
 To appreciate how transactional lawyers add value under this hypothesis, this 
article distinguishes between client-regulatory legal work and transaction-regulatory legal 
work.93 Although transactional counsel can add value by performing client-regulatory 
legal work, there are two important limitations on that value. The first is that many 
companies that engage in transactions—and therefore many clients of transactional 
                                                 
85 The Limits of Lawyering, supra note 45, at 10-11. 
86 Jonathan Macey, The Limits of Legal Analysis: Using Externalities to Explain Legal 
Opinions in Structured Finance,  84 TEX. L. REV. 75, 77 (2005). 
87 The Limits of Lawyering, supra note 45, at 11 n. 54. 
88 See Appendix A, at F.1 (indicating that the work of transactional lawyers involves law 
to a significant extent).  
89 Id. 
90 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. See also Rasmussen, supra note 26, at 2749-
50 (observing that “law is the province of lawyers, and thus, lawyers will be more likely 
to perceive an important role for law in any given transaction than would nonlawyers”).  
91 See Appendix A, at F.1 (showing that 76.5% percent of clients said their lawyer’s 
transactional work involves law to a “significant” or “great” extent).  
92 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (discussing these predictions). 
93 See supra note 43 and following text. 
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lawyers—are not regulated entities.94 The legal work performed by those transactional 
lawyers would not be client-regulatory.  
 
 The second limitation is that, even where their clients are regulated entities, 
transactional lawyers do not always need to get deeply involved with the regulation. Even 
when regulation is central to a transaction, the findings show that transactional lawyers 
do not always feel a need to understand their clients’ regulatory concerns in detail.95 The 
majority of transactional lawyers understand those concerns only to the extent needed to 
know when to alert regulatory counsel—typically in-house counsel of the client96—to the 
possibility of legal issues.97  
 
 Experience confirms this second limitation. Transactional lawyers representing a 
bank, for example, need only become sufficiently familiar with the federal margin 
regulations98 to know when to alert regulatory counsel that there may be a compliance 
issue.99 Transactional counsel also are not “typically requested [to opine] on issues whose 
                                                 
94 Although 59% of the client-respondents reported that their business was significantly 
more highly regulated than “ordinary” business corporations (see Appendix A, at F.2), 
this relatively high indication of regulation may reflect only that more heavily regulated 
companies responded disproportionately to the survey. 
95 Only about a third of the lawyer-respondents felt the need to understand their clients’ 
regulatory concerns in detail. Appendix A, at F.3. Although almost half the client-
respondents felt that their transactional lawyers did need such a detailed understanding, 
this apparent discrepancy simply may reflect that 58.8% of the client survey data were 
from businesses—whereas only 28.7% of the lawyer-respondent data related to clients—
that said they were “significantly” or “greatly” more highly regulated than “ordinary” 
business corporations. See Appendix A, at F.2. Breaking down the data shows a strong 
correlation between the degree of client regulation and the extent to which clients want 
their lawyers to understand their regulatory concerns in more detail.  
96 The Limits of Lawyering, supra note 45, at 51 (observing that many in-house legal 
staffs have attorneys specifically dedicated to compliance with law). See also id. at 35-36 
(observing that in-house counsel typical give no-violation-of-law opinions). Regulatory 
counsel also can be colleagues of the transactional lawyers or lawyers at other firms. 
97 Appendix A, at F.3.  
98 Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 221 (restricting certain bank loans used to purchase or 
refinance the purchase of margin stock). 
99 Such a compliance issue would arise, for example, where the bank makes a loan 
secured by margin stock, especially where that loan is used to purchase or refinance the 
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analysis would be independent of the transaction’s fact pattern.”100 This interplay of 
transactional and regulatory counsel may well have evolved because the complexities of 
modern regulation can make it impractical for a lawyer to gain and maintain expertise in 
both regulation of a client and regulation of transactions engaged in by the client. 
 
 Consistent with those limitations, the findings suggest that transactional counsel 
reduce regulatory costs, and thus add value, primarily by performing transaction-
regulatory legal work: by providing expertise in the law and regulations that generally 
govern the transaction and by understanding the rationale for the contractual provisions in 
the transaction documents.101 This expertise can include, for example, ensuring that 
desired legal priorities are achieved, that security interests are properly perfected, and that 
subordination agreements are enforceable; that indenture covenants are not violated and 
that covenant protections adequately balance debtor and creditor needs; that commercial-
law remedies to made available upon insolvency or default work in harmony with debtor-
creditor law protections; that legal entities are established in the form (e.g., corporation, 
trust, partnership, limited liability company) and with the governance characteristics most 
effective for the task, given such competing constraints as the tradeoff between equity-
holder and creditor rights, bankruptcy law, tax law, and accounting; that guaranties and 
other credit supports are legally enforceable; that any special-purpose entities achieve the 
applicable legal requirements of rating agencies and investors, such as “true sale,” “non-
consolidation,” and other “bankruptcy remoteness” criteria; that cross-border legal 
demands are complied with; and that any securities law requirements are met.102 These 
findings conflict with scholarly conclusions that transactional lawyers primarily add the 
                                                                                                                                                 
purchase of margin stock. Noncompliance with Regulation U would render the loan void. 
Stonehill v. Sec. Nat’l Bank, 68 F.R.D. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
100 The Limits of Lawyering, supra note 45, at 11 n. 53. For an efficiency explanation of 
which transactional counsel is better situated to provide legal opinions, see Macey, The 
Limits of Legal Analysis, supra note 86, at 76-78. 
101 Appendix A, at F.4. 
102 These examples also reflect the author’s experience.  
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same types of value that could be added in business transactions by any sophisticated 
negotiating party, not necessarily one specially trained as a lawyer.103   
 
 4. Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by 
acting as reputational intermediaries.  The findings weakly support the fourth 
hypothesis, that transactional lawyers add value by acting as reputational intermediaries. 
One of the main claims of this hypothesis—that much greater trust should be given to 
non-legal information when the party giving that information (e.g., a company being 
acquired in an M&A transaction) is represented by a reputable law firm104—was almost 
unanimously rejected by transactional lawyers and clients alike.105 This rejection is 
particularly significant because this hypothesis, that transactional lawyers add value by 
acting as reputational intermediaries, is the most agreed-upon scholarly theory.106 
                                                 
103 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
104 See, e.g., Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 288-93 
(describing the central role of transactional lawyers as reputational intermediaries paid to 
verify the seller-client’s information for the buyer). This article’s survey did not 
specifically test a weaker form of this claim, that transactional lawyers add value as 
reputational intermediaries in certain securities offerings by delivering a limited 
“negative assurance” legal opinion as to absence of knowledge of potential securities-law 
disclosure violations under SEC Rule 10b-5. See Gilson, Value Creation by Business 
Lawyers, supra note 7, at 291-93 (using the perspective of transactional-lawyer-as-
reputational-intermediary to help explain the existence of these opinions). I have no 
doubt these opinions add some value, but they effectively address legal conclusions and 
therefore fall within this article’s discussion of legal opinions generally. See supra notes 
78-87, 45 and accompanying text. In any event, these opinions are appropriate in only 
very narrow circumstances. Special Report of the Task Force on Securities Law Opinions 
of the ABA Section of Business Law, Negative Assurances in Securities Offerings, 59 
BUS. LAW. 1513 (2004).     
105 Appendix A, at B.5 (68.0% of lawyer-respondents and 82.4% of client-respondents 
said that non-legal information should not be trusted any more simply because the party 
giving that information is represented by a reputable law firm). Only 30.7% of lawyers 
and 17.7% of clients felt that information should be trusted even “somewhat” more, and 
only one respondent (a lawyer) felt that information should be trusted “much” more). Id. 
106 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. But cf. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value 
of Lawyers, supra note 9, at 42-43 (suggesting that the lawyer’s role as reputational 
intermediary is declining over time). Perhaps that decline is at least partly due to the 
increasing limited liability partnership (LLP) organization of law firms. Cf. Larry E. 
Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 
1727-28 (1998) (positing that “unlimited liability, by substituting for reputational and 
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 To some extent, these findings should not be surprising. Aside from the 
incongruity of lawyers—who, after all, do not have the highest public trust—acting as 
proxies for trustworthiness, the value of a law firm as a reputational intermediary would 
be expected to be proportional to the need for trustworthiness and credibility. In simple or 
routine transactions, that need may be small, whereas the cost of hiring a high-reputation 
law firm may be expensive.  
 
 Furthermore, even in complex or unusual transactions involving large amounts of 
money, the need for trustworthiness and credibility often concerns financial, not legal, 
information.107 To this end, accountants, and not lawyers, are held responsible for 
certifying the accuracy of that information.108  
 
 The findings additionally reveal other limitations to the reputational intermediary 
hypothesis. Contrary to theory, reputational value per se is less important than the quality 
and experience provided by high-reputation transactional counsel, who add value 
primarily by performing better legal work. Thus, one-hundred percent of client-
                                                                                                                                                 
financial capital, arguably provides an important assurance to clients that law firms will 
discipline shirking and other self-interested conduct by their members.”). 
107 Even to the extent the need for trustworthiness and credibility concerns legal 
information, one commentator suggests that reputation alone may be insufficient. Lipson, 
supra note 81, at 111 (observing that “[i]f the value of a[] [legal] opinion lies in the fact 
that it is evidence that a reputable [law] firm has represented the Company, one might 
also think that the most reputable firms could dispense with issuing opinions entirely. . . . 
The reputation of the firm alone would suffice as a signal of probity, diligence, etc. to the 
putative opinion recipient. Yet, this is not how it works out in practice. The fact that a 
firm already has a top-flight reputation does not exempt the firm from having to give 
opinions on behalf of its clients.”). 
108 Steven L. Schwarcz, Financial Information Failure and Lawyer Responsibility, 31 J. 
CORP. L. issue no. 4 (forthcoming Sept 2006) (examining the boundary between lawyer 
and accountant responsibility for financial information). Even negative assurance legal 
opinions (discussed supra note 104) commonly exclude legal conclusions based on 
financial information. E-mail from William Widen, Associate Professor, University of 
Miami School of Law, & former Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, to the author (July 
21, 2005) (observing that “it was quite common, in [his] experience, for lawyers to 
exclude financial statement information from the scope of the negative assurance given to 
underwriters in a 10b-5 [negative assurance opinion] letter”). 
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respondents and almost ninety-nine percent of lawyer-respondents cited experience as the 
most important reason that law firms contribute to the success of a transaction.109 
Reputation value by itself was a secondary consideration, along with the law firm having 
smart lawyers.110 One lawyer’s comment typifies the responses: “Skill not reputation is 
the key. Most lawyers don’t care about ‘firm name,’ but can quickly assess 
competence.”111  
 
 Reputation also can create costs that offset value. For example, to the extent a 
party to a transaction hires a high-reputation law firm, another party may feel 
“outgunned” and thus hire its own high-reputation law firm, resulting in a “dollar 
auction” arms race. These costs could be substantial; approximately forty-three percent of 
client respondents said they would consider hiring a highly-reputed law firm simply 
because the opposing party did so.112 
 
 5.  Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by 
providing client privilege and confidentiality.  The findings are mixed regarding the fifth 
hypothesis, that transactional lawyers add value by providing client privilege and 
confidentiality.113 While forty-four percent of client-respondents said the attorney-client 
privilege provided significant value and twenty-five percent even said it provided great 
                                                 
109 Appendix A, at B.2. 
110 Id. 
111 Cf. Timothy Hia, Note, Que Sera, Sera? The Future of Specialization in Large Law 
Firms, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 541, 560 (2002) (observing that training and 
specialization of lawyers within law firms is increasingly important to enhancement of 
reputational value in specific practice areas). To this extent, reputational value may be 
self-enhancing, in that high-reputation firms are more likely to train their lawyers well in 
order to enhance the quality of their work and thus preserve the reputation. 
112 Appendix A, at B.3. 
113 The attorney-client privilege first developed under Roman law, but was not well-
entrenched in modern law until the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, when it was viewed as a 
means of protecting an attorney’s honor as a gentleman. Ken M. Zeidner, Note, 
Inadvertent Disclosure and the Attorney-Client Privilege: Looking to the Work-Product 
Doctrine for Guidance, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1320 (2001). 
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value,114 most respondents said that this privilege did not significantly facilitate 
transactions or, if it did facilitate transactions, that it did so only to a small degree.115  
 
 These results can perhaps be explained by the perspective of respondents to the 
questionnaire: from the standpoint of any given client, this privilege can be valuable. It is 
less clear, however, that the privilege creates net overall value—value viewed here from 
a broad societal perspective (and not from the standpoint of any single client).116  
 
 Even if this hypothesis accounted for a portion of transactional-lawyer value, that 
portion may well fluctuate over time. There appears to be a trend, at least in the corporate 
context, to narrow the attorney-client privilege.117 Also, privileges and confidentiality are 
somewhat artificial and states could, if they wished, create similar privileges for non-
lawyer advisers.118 This article therefore does not attach much significance to this fifth 
hypothesis.  
 
 6.  Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by 
creating economies of scope.  The findings only weakly support the sixth hypothesis, that 
transactional lawyers add value through economies of scope. Recall that this hypothesis 
predicts that transactional lawyers can more efficiently perform non-legal transactional 
                                                 
114 Appendix A, at D.1.  
115 Appendix A, at D.2. 
116 Cf. text accompanying note 23, supra (viewing “value” from a broad societal 
perspective, not from the standpoint of any single client). 
117 See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the 
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 159 (1993) (arguing 
that traditional rationales for the attorney-client privilege do not hold in the corporate 
context, and that the corporate attorney-client privilege should be abolished). See also 
Thomas Ross, Knowing No Other Duty: Privity, The Myth of Elitism, and the 
Transformation of the Legal Profession, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 819, 827 (1997) 
(observing the extent to which state legislatures are narrowing the attorney-client 
privilege). 
118 Similar privileges already exist, for example, for communications between individuals 
and physicians, clergymen, and therapists. Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and 
Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 32 (1998). 
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work, such as negotiating and drafting deal documentation,119 because they are already 
performing the legal work. A majority of both lawyer and client respondents indeed 
agreed that, at least to some extent, transactional lawyers perform non-legal work because 
someone must do so and transactional lawyers are already involved.120 Almost half the 
lawyer-respondents also felt that such non-legal work is, to a significant extent, 
necessarily incident to their legal tasks.121 In contrast, though, most client-respondents 
felt that non-legal work performed by transactional lawyers is only to some extent if at all 
necessarily incident to those lawyers’ legal tasks.122 
 
 More problematically for the economy-of-scope hypothesis, the findings call into 
question its hallmark—that transactional lawyers can more efficiently perform the non-
legal transactional work. Almost two-thirds of client-respondents indicated that the non-
legal work performed by transactional lawyers could be performed more efficiently by 
non-lawyers.123 The findings also show that transactional lawyers usually charge at their 
full rate when performing non-legal work,124 so clients pay dearly for it.125 
 
 It therefore behooves lawyers, for their integrity if not also to attempt to achieve a 
true economy of scope (and, more self-interestedly, to preserve this franchise126), to 
                                                 
119 See supra note 51 and following text. 
120 Appendix A, at C.3. 
121 Appendix A, at C.4. 
122 Id. 
123 Appendix A, at C.6. To some extent, this view may reflect the rate charged by 
transactional lawyers, next discussed, when performing non-legal work.  
124 Appendix A, at C.5 (84.6% of client-respondents said their transactional lawyers 
charged full rates for non-legal work). 
125 Cf. Financial Information Failure and Lawyer Responsibility, supra note 108 
(showing in another context that economy of scope alone would not justify extending 
lawyer responsibility to non-legal matters—namely, that lawyers advising a public firm 
should not be charged with responsibility as independent gatekeepers vis-à-vis the firm’s 
accountants because, even where such lawyers are already involved in advising the firm 
(and thus would achieve an economy of scope by acting as accounting gatekeepers), the 
cost of imposing this additional responsibility would exceed its benefits). 
126 Although the findings do not reveal the precise size of this franchise, more than two-
thirds of client-respondents believe that the work of transactional lawyers can be 
performed at least to some extent by a non-lawyer. Appendix A, at C.1. 
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perform this work as efficiently as feasible. To this end, law schools should consider 
emphasizing writing and contract-drafting and negotiating skills, which business schools 
(at least regarding writing and drafting) do not presently emphasize.127  
 
 This recognizes that economies of scope exist only where the same investment 
supports multiple profitable activities less expensively in combination than separately.128 
Utilizing transactional lawyers to negotiate and draft contracts merely because they 
already are involved in examining regulatory aspects of the transaction does not ensure 
that each additional activity will be performed profitably, or as profitably as such activity 
would be performed by other parties. The negotiating and contracting process itself can 
create, or destroy, value—the former being exemplified by the creation of personal 
relationships that help build business relationships between opposing parties and the 
consensus problem-solving that helps facilitate closing the business transaction to all 
parties’ satisfaction.129 Where transactional lawyers do not facilitate those interpersonal 
and problem-solving goals, they may well destroy the value that an economy of scope 
could achieve—the ultimate manifestation of which is a lawyer who, by obstinacy or 
otherwise, causes a valuable transaction to fail.130 This suggests that law schools 
                                                 
127 See Leslie L. Cooney & Lynn A. Epstein, Classroom Associates: Creating a Skills 
Incubation Process for Tomorrow’s Lawyer, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 361, 364-372 (2001); 
Jonathan C. Lipson, Doing Deals in Law School, BUS. L. TODAY (Sep./Oct. 2005). 
128 See supra note 50 and accompanying text (defining economies of scope). 
129 One client-questionnaire respondent, for example, observed that an important goal of 
contracting is to “help build our business relationship with the other party.” Survey 
Response on file with author. See also The World: China—“One Billion Customers” 
(PBS, WUNC FM, radio broadcast Nov. 21, 2005) (interview by Lisa Mullins with James 
McGregor, author of  ONE BILLION CUSTOMERS—LESSONS FROM THE FRONT LINES 
DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA and former China bureau chief, WALL STREET JOURNAL): “In 
China, you negotiate a contract but that piece of paper in the end means nothing. But the 
process of negotiating and the personal relationships you build while negotiating that 
contract and the problem solving methods you work out together in doing that, those are 
the things that are going to make the business go ahead and hold on.” This observation 
appears true in the U.S. as well. 
130 In this regard, it is noteworthy that whereas most lawyer-respondents felt they actively 
tried to facilitate good relationships with opposing counsel, clients did not always share 
that perception. Appendix A, at C.7. 
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additionally should consider stressing consensus problem-solving and the importance of 
interpersonal relationships. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 This article’s findings show that transactional lawyers add value, or at least say 
that they add value, primarily by reducing regulatory costs. Of the two types of regulatory 
costs—client-regulatory and transaction-regulatory131—transactional lawyers normally 
focus on the latter. This may help explain why they usually concentrate in such 
transaction-regulatory intensive areas as securities law, M&A, bank lending, structured 
finance, and project finance.132  
 
 These findings present a very different picture of how business lawyers add value 
than that portrayed by existing scholarship, thereby challenging the reigning models of 
transactional lawyers as “transaction cost engineers” and “reputational intermediaries.” 
Under those models, transactional lawyer value “rests neither on [the] inherently legal 
character [of transactional lawyer work] nor … on skills acquired through traditional 
legal training.”133 As a result, scholars have predicted a bleak possible vision of the 
future, in which “the [legal] profession’s transactional role is reduced from engineer to 
draftsman, at the expense of lawyers’ prosperity and the intellectual interest of their 
work”134 due to competition with other professions, such as investment bankers and 
accountants.135  
 
 That vision, however, appears flawed. If transactional lawyers provide most of 
their value through their expertise in law, they are unlikely to face competition with, 
                                                 
131 For an explanation of the differences between these costs, see supra notes 44 & 87-45 
and accompanying text. 
132 Indeed, unregulated companies that engage in routine unregulated transactions often 
do not hire outside transactional counsel, and sometimes might not use counsel at all. 
Schwarcz, supra note 5, at __.   
133 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 301 (commenting in the 
context of the transaction cost engineer model). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
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much less to be replaced by, non-legal professionals. Indeed, fewer than two percent of 
lawyer-respondents and fewer than twelve percent of client-respondents felt that 
transactional lawyer work could be performed by non-lawyers to any significant 
extent.136 To the extent law and regulation become more pervasive in the future, 
transactional lawyers will become even more uniquely valuable. Contrary to academic 
claims, transactional lawyers are (and should be) secure in their professions.  
 
 This article’s findings also suggest flaws in the existing scholarly visions of how 
legal education should change. Based on existing models, scholars have argued for an 
increased focus on finance theory and transaction-cost economics.137 Some even claim 
that teaching these economic subjects in lieu of the case method would help law students 
to develop judgment.138 Although, as a professor of law and business, I regard finance 
theory and transaction-cost economics as important, the findings suggest that budding 
transactional lawyers would be even better served by focusing on law and on applying 
legal concepts to solve real-world problems139—goals that the case method has a long 
and distinguished record of helping students achieve.140 Similarly, law schools should 
introduce, if not emphasize, the importance of developing good working relationships 
                                                 
136 Appendix A, at C.1. Athough “some” work performed by transactional lawyers might 
be performed more efficiently by non-lawyers (compare Appendix A, at C.1, with 
Appendix A, at C.6), most such work could not because transactional lawyers add most 
of their value by reducing regulatory costs. 
137 See, e.g., Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 304-05; Gilson 
& Mnookin, supra note 8, at 3-14. 
138 See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 8, at 6-7 (arguing that teaching such disciplines as 
“[t]ransaction cost economics” and “the economics of information” will more effectively 
“send out from law school more students with judgment than just those who arrived 
already possessing it.”).  
139 Cf. Lipson, supra note 127. 
140 This does not imply that finance and economic theory should be ignored; the question 
is one of balance. Cf. Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. 
LEG. ED. 342, 351 (2005) (arguing that “[m]odern finance [has] become the language of 
business, and lawyers need[] to be knowledgeable about it in order to serve their 
clients”). See also id. at 352 (discussing the “need for technical proficiency” in finance 
and economics on the part of business lawyers). 
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between opposing lawyers in business transactions.141 Perhaps Dean Kronman has been 
right, after all, in emphasizing the importance of traditional case analysis over theory and 
social sciences.142 
 
 This article does not claim, however, that its findings are dispositive of these 
issues. Its use of survey methodology has inherent limitations.143 But it is nonetheless a 
first empirical step in engaging the debate over these issues. 
                                                 
141 Business schools already emphasize the importance of developing good working 
relationships between parties. See, e.g., Joshua D. Rosenberg, Interpersonal Dynamics: 
Helping Lawyers Learn the Skills, and the Importance, or [sic] Human Relationships in 
the Practice of Law, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1225, 1277-78 (2004) (“Although courses in 
relationship skills may seem odd to those familiar with law schools, similar courses, and 
numerous varieties of courses that teach teamwork, have been staples at some of the 
country’s best Business Schools for decades.”); Martin E. P. Seligman, Paul R. Verkuil, 
Terry H. Kang, Why Lawyers are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33, 51 (2001) (“[L]aw 
school pedagogy differs from that of business schools, where cooperative projects and 
thinking are the rule in leading MBA programs.”). 
142 Cf. ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 225-64 (1993) (maintaining this emphasis) with Gilson & Mnookin, supra 
note 8, at 7 (arguing that teaching the disciplines referred to supra note 138 “will do a far 
better job [of training transactional lawyers] than the case method purveyors of Dean 
Kronman’s golden age could ever have imagined”).  
143 See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text. 
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Addendum 1: Form of Lawyer Questionnaire 
 
           
LAWYER QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Name: 
 
Firm: 
 
Position with Firm: 
 
Location: 
 
Area(s) of Practice: 
 
Years of Legal Experience: 
 
 
NOTICE:  This questionnaire’s purpose is to help understand the value added by 
outside counsel in the negotiating and contracting process leading to closing a 
commercial, financial, or other business transaction. Please assume that all 
questions below pertain to those types of transactions.  
 
A. Minimizing Potential for Ex Post Litigation 
 
1.  When drafting a contract, what are you primarily trying to accomplish?: (a) __ setting 
forth a roadmap for the parties to follow in their ongoing relationship; (b) __ protecting 
your client from future litigation; (c) __both of the above; (d) __ other (please specify 
below). 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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__________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________. 
 
2.  Approximately what percentage of contracts that you draft eventually end up in 
litigation (please specify percentage)?:  ___% 
 
3.  Approximately what percentage of those litigated contracts are litigated over issues 
that were anticipated during negotiation?: ___% 
 
4.  To what extent, if any, are lawyer-drafted contracts less likely to result in future 
litigation than contracts drafted without using lawyers?: (a) __ much less likely; (b) __ 
somewhat less likely; (c) __ not less likely; (d) __ uncertain.   
 
 
B. Acting as Reputational Intermediaries 
 
1. To what extent, if any, does a highly reputed law firm contribute to the success of a 
transaction?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; 
(d) __ to a small extent or not at all.   
 
2. If a highly reputed law firm contributes to the success of a transaction, why might it do 
so (check all that apply)?:  (a) __ such law firm is experienced in the type of transaction; 
(b) __ such law firm has smart lawyers; (c) __ hiring such law firm signals 
trustworthiness and credibility to other transaction parties; (d) __ hiring such law firm 
signals trustworthiness and credibility to potential investors. 
 
3. Clients should seriously consider hiring a highly reputed law firm (check all that 
apply):  (a) __ in all complex or unusual transactions; (b) __ in all transactions involving 
large dollar amounts; (c) __ in all transactions where the transaction parties put a 
premium on trustworthiness and credibility; (d) __ in all transactions where potential 
investors put a premium on trustworthiness and credibility; (e) __ in all transactions 
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where opposing parties hire highly reputed law firms.   
 
4. Assuming no conflicts of interest, highly reputed law firms (check all that apply):  (a) 
__ are as willing to be hired for unusual transactions as for more typical transactions; (b) 
__ are sometimes reluctant to be hired for unusual transactions; (c) __ may be biased 
against innovating changes in transactions; (d) __ are not biased against innovating 
changes in the transactions.  
 
5. To what extent, if any, should parties to a transaction trust non-legal information 
provided by another transaction party if that party is represented by a reputable law firm, 
as opposed to where that party is represented only by in-house counsel?:  (a) __ should 
trust that information much more; (b) __ should trust that information somewhat more; 
(c) __ should have no greater trust in that information. 
 
 
C. Creating Economies of Scope 
 
1.  To what extent could your work on a transaction be performed by a non-lawyer?:  (a) 
__ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small 
extent or not at all.    
 
2.  Please briefly describe any non-legal work that falls under this category:   
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.  To what extent do you perform that non-legal work simply because someone must, 
and you already are involved in the transaction?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a 
significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all. 
 
4.  To what extent is that non-legal work necessarily incident to your legal tasks?:  (a) __ 
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to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small 
extent or not at all. 
 
5.  Do you charge at the same rate for that non-legal work?:  __ Yes;  __ No. 
 
6.  Could that non-legal work be performed more efficiently by non-lawyers?:  __ Yes;  
__ No. 
 
7.  When negotiating a transaction, to what extent do you actively try to facilitate good 
relationships with opposing counsel?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant 
extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all.  
 
 
D.  Creating Client Privilege and Confidentiality   
 
1.  To what extent do you protect your client by creating an attorney-client privilege?:  (a) 
__ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small 
extent or not at all. 
 
2.  To what extent does the attorney-client privilege help facilitate transactions?:  (a) __ 
to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small 
extent or not at all; (e) __ the attorney-client privilege works against facilitating 
transactions (for example, by increasing information asymmetry among transaction 
parties). 
 
 
E.  Reducing Transaction Costs   
 
1.  What percentage of your work on a transaction involves preparing, issuing, and/or 
reviewing legal opinions?:  ___ %.  
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2.  To what extent are you responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect your client 
against, possible future events that could change your client’s business incentives?:  (a) 
__ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small 
extent or not at all.  
 
3.  To what extent are you responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect your client 
against, possible future events that could change the business incentives of other 
transaction parties?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some 
extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all. 
 
4.  To what extent do you monitor that your client’s officers act on the client’s behalf?:  
(a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a 
small extent or not at all.   
 
 
F.  Reducing Regulatory Costs   
 
1.  To what extent does your work on a transaction actually involve law?:  (a) __ to a 
great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to a small extent.  
 
2.  To what extent are your non-bank transactional clients more regulated by government 
than an ordinary business corporation?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant 
extent; (c) __ to a small extent; (d) __ not at all. 
 
3.  When you represent a bank or other regulated entity in a business transaction, to what 
extent do you need to understand the details of that client’s particular regulatory 
concerns?:  (a) __ in detail; (b) __  only sufficiently to know when to alert regulatory 
counsel to the possibility of legal issues; (c) __ other [please describe: ___________ 
___________________________________________________________________]. 
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4.  When you represent an ordinary business corporation in a business transaction, which 
of the following statements are true (mark all that are true)?:  (a) __ you need to provide 
expertise in the law and regulations that generally govern that type of transaction; (b) __  
you need to understand the rationale for the contractual provisions in the transaction 
documents; (c) __ other [please describe: __________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________] 
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Addendum 2: Form of Client Questionnaire 
 
 
           
CLIENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Name: 
 
Company: 
 
Position with Company: 
 
Location: 
 
Area(s) of Responsibility: 
 
Years of Experience: 
 
 
NOTICE:  This questionnaire’s purpose is to help understand the value added by 
outside counsel in the negotiating and contracting process leading to closing a 
commercial, financial, or other business transaction. Please assume that all 
questions below pertain to those types of transactions.  
 
A. Minimizing Potential for Ex Post Litigation 
 
1.  When you hire lawyers to draft a contract, what do you want them to primarily 
accomplish?: (a) __ to set forth a roadmap for the parties to follow in their ongoing 
relationship; (b) __ to protect your company from future litigation; (c)__ both of the 
above; (d) __ other (please specify below). 
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__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________. 
 
2.  Approximately what percentage of your contracts eventually end up in litigation 
(please specify percentage)?:  ___% 
 
3.  Approximately what percentage of those litigated contracts are litigated over issues 
that were anticipated during negotiation?: ___% 
 
4.  To what extent, if any, are lawyer-drafted contracts less likely to result in future 
litigation than contracts drafted without using lawyers?: (a) __ much less likely; (b) __ 
somewhat less likely; (c) __ not less likely; (d) __ uncertain.   
 
 
B. Acting as Reputational Intermediaries 
 
1. To what extent, if any, does hiring a highly reputed law firm contribute to the success 
of a transaction?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some 
extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all.   
 
2. If hiring a highly reputed law firm contributes to the success of a transaction, why 
might it do so (check all that apply)?:  (a) __ such law firm is experienced in the type of 
transaction; (b) __ such law firm has smart lawyers; (c) __ hiring such law firm signals 
trustworthiness and credibility to other transaction parties; (d) __ hiring such law firm 
signals trustworthiness and credibility to potential investors. 
 
3. One should seriously consider hiring a highly reputed law firm (check all that apply):  
(a) __ in all complex or unusual transactions; (b) __ in all transactions involving large 
dollar amounts; (c) __ in all transactions where the transaction parties put a premium on 
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trustworthiness and credibility; (d) __ in all transactions where potential investors put a 
premium on trustworthiness and credibility; (e) __ in all transactions where opposing 
parties hire highly reputed law firms.   
 
4. Assuming no conflicts of interest, highly reputed law firms (check all that apply):  (a) 
__ are as willing to be hired for unusual transactions as for more typical transactions; (b) 
__ are sometimes reluctant to be hired for unusual transactions; (c) __ may be biased 
against innovating changes in transactions; (d) __ are not biased against innovating 
changes in the transactions.  
 
5. To what extent, if any, do you trust non-legal information provided by another 
transaction party if that party is represented by a reputable law firm, as opposed to where 
that party is represented only by in-house counsel?:  (a) __ trust that information much 
more; (b) __ trust that information somewhat more; (c) __ no greater trust in that 
information. 
 
C. Creating Economies of Scope 
 
1.  To what extent could your lawyer’s work on a transaction be performed by a non-
lawyer?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) 
__ to a small extent or not at all.    
 
2.  Please briefly describe any non-legal work that falls under this category:   
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.  To what extent does your lawyer perform that non-legal work simply because 
someone must, and your lawyer already is involved in the transaction?:  (a) __ to a great 
extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not 
at all. 
41 
 
 
4.  To what extent is that non-legal work necessarily incident to your lawyer’s legal 
tasks?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ 
to a small extent or not at all. 
 
5.  Does your lawyer charge at the same rate for that non-legal work?:  __ Yes;  __ No. 
 
6.  Could that non-legal work be performed more efficiently by non-lawyers?:  __ Yes;  
__ No. 
 
7.  To what extent does involving your lawyer in that non-legal work add value by 
providing third-party objectivity?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; 
(c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all. 
 
8.  To what extent do you want your lawyer, when negotiating a transaction, to facilitate 
good relationships with opposing counsel?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant 
extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all.  
 
 
D.  Creating Client Privilege and Confidentiality   
 
1.  To what extent do you value the protection provided by the attorney-client privilege?:  
(a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a 
small extent or not at all. 
 
2.  To what extent does the attorney-client privilege help facilitate transactions?:  (a) __ 
to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small 
extent or not at all; (e) __ the attorney-client privilege works against facilitating 
transactions (for example, by increasing information asymmetry among transaction 
parties). 
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E.  Reducing Transaction Costs   
 
1.  What percentage of your lawyer’s work on a transaction involves preparing and 
issuing legal opinions?:  ___ %.  
 
2.  To what extent is your lawyer responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect you 
against, possible future events that could change your business incentives?:  (a) __ to a 
great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent 
or not at all.  
 
3.  To what extent is your lawyer responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect you 
against, possible future events that could change the business incentives of other 
transaction parties?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some 
extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all. 
 
4.  To what extent does your lawyer monitor that your company’s officers act on the 
company’s behalf?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some 
extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all.   
 
 
F.  Reducing Regulatory Costs   
 
1.  To what extent does your lawyer’s work on a transaction actually involve law?:  (a) __ 
to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to a small extent. 
 
2.  To what extent is your company more regulated by government than an ordinary 
business corporation?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to a 
small extent; (d) __ not at all. 
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3.  When you hire outside lawyers to work on a business transaction, to what extent 
should they need to understand the details of your company’s particular regulatory 
concerns?:  (a) __ in detail; (b) __  only sufficiently to know when to alert your 
company’s regulatory counsel to the possibility of legal issues. 
 
4.  When you hire outside lawyers to work on a business transaction, which of the 
following statements are true (mark all that are true)?:  (a) __ they should provide 
expertise in the law and regulations that generally govern that type of transaction; (b) __  
they should understand the rationale for the contractual provisions in the transaction 
documents. 
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED PRESENTATION OF THE DATA UNDERLYING THIS ARTICLE’S 
FINDINGS 
 
A. Minimizing Potential for Ex Post Litigation 
 
1.  When drafting a contract, what are you primarily trying to accomplish?:  
 
 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=75) 
New 
York 
(n=28) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients144
(n=17) 
(a) Setting forth a roadmap 
for the parties to follow in 
their ongoing relationship 
9.3 % 3.6 % 3.7 % 25.0% 0.0 % 
(b) protecting your client 
from future litigation 
0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0% 11.8 % 
(c) both of the above 84.0 % 89.3 % 92.6 % 65.0 % 88.2 % 
(d) other  32.0 % 35.7 % 37.0 % 20.0 % 11.8 % 
  
 
2.  Approximately what percentage of contracts that you draft eventually end up in 
litigation (please specify percentage)?:  ___%   
 
Lawyers  
Overall 
(n=74) 
New York 
(n=27) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients
(n=17) 
Average 2.06 % 1.65 % 2.26 % 2.33 % 1.24 % 
Median 1.0 % 1.0 % 1.0 % 1.0 % 1.0 % 
                                                 
144 The wording of the client question and possible answers varied slightly. See 
Addendum 2 (Form of Client Questionnaire).      
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Standard Deviation 3.33 2.64 3.16 4.37 2.36 
 
 
3.  Approximately what percentage of those litigated contracts are litigated over issues 
that were anticipated during negotiation?:   
 
Lawyers  
Overall 
(n=55)145
New York 
(n=19) 
Philadelphia 
(n=17) 
Chicago 
(n=19) 
Clients 
(n=12) 
0 25.5 % 31.6% 23.5 % 21.1 % 50.0% 
1-20 10.9 % 0.0 % 11.8% 21.1 % 16.7% 
21-40 7.3 % 5.3 % 11.8 % 5.3 % 0.0% 
41-60 27.3 % 36.8 % 17.6 % 26.3 % 33.3% 
61-80 9.1 % 10.5 % 11.8 % 10.5 % 0.0% 
81-99 3.6 % 0.0 % 11.8 % 0.0 % 0.0% 
100 16.4 % 15.8 % 17.6 % 15.8 % 0.0% 
Average 43.71 % 43.95 % 47.41 % 40.16 % 17.17 %
Median  50 % 50 %  50 % 50 % 0.50 % 
Standard Deviation 36.92  36.31   40.01  36.36 24.30  
 
 
4.  To what extent, if any, are lawyer-drafted contracts less likely to result in future 
litigation than contracts drafted without using lawyers?: 
   
                                                 
145 The low response rate to this question stems from the fact that most who answered 
zero to Question A.2 found this question non-applicable.   
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 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=72) 
New 
York 
(n=26 ) 
Philadelphia 
(n=26) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients 
(n=14) 
 (a) Much less likely 80.6 % 84.6 %  76.9 % 80.0 %  64.3 % 
 (b) Somewhat less likely  9.7 %  3.9 %  11.5 %  15.0 %  28.6 % 
 (c) Not less likely   0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0  %  0.0 %  0.0 % 
 (d) Uncertain   11.1 % 11.5 % 15.4  % 5.0 % 7.1% 
 
 
B. Acting as Reputational Intermediaries 
 
1. To what extent, if any, does a highly reputed law firm contribute to the success of a 
transaction?:   
 
 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=74 ) 
New 
York 
(n=28) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27) 
Chicago 
(n=19) 
Clients 
(n=16) 
 (a) To a great extent   47.3 % 46.4 %    51.9 % 42.1 %   25.0 %  
 (b) To a significant extent   41.9 % 42.9 %   33.3 % 52.6 %    37.5 %  
 (c) To some extent 10.8 %  10.7 %  14.8 %  5.3 % 18.8 % 
 (d) To a small extent or not 
at all  
  1.4 %  0.0 %  0.0 % 5.3 %    18.8 % 
 
 
2. If a highly reputed law firm contributes to the success of a transaction, why might it do 
so (check all that apply)?:   
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 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=75) 
New 
York 
(n=28) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients 
(n=14) 
(a) Such law firm is 
experienced in the type of 
transaction 
 98.7 % 100.0  %    96.3 %   100.0 %  100.0%  
(b) Such law firm has smart 
lawyers 
 73.3 %  75.0 %     66.7 %  80.0 %   57.1 %  
(c) Hiring such law firm 
signals trustworthiness and 
credibility to other 
transaction parties 
 81.3 %    82.1 %   85.2 %  75.0 % 71.4 % 
(d) Hiring such law firm 
signals trustworthiness and 
credibility to potential 
investors 
74.7 %    75.0 %  77.8 %   70.0 %   42.9 %
 
 
3. Clients should seriously consider hiring a highly reputed law firm (check all that 
apply):  
 
 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=74) 
New 
York 
(n=28) 
Philadelphia 
(n=26) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients 
(n=14) 
(a) In all complex or unusual 
transactions   
  98.6 %   100.0 %     96.2 % 100.0 %    85.7 %  
(b) In all transactions 
involving large dollar 
 68.9 %   71.4 %     76.9 % 55.0 %    64.3 %  
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amounts 
(c) In all transactions where 
the transaction parties put a 
premium on trustworthiness 
and credibility 
 62.2 %    64.3 %   80.8 %  35.0 % 42.9 % 
(d) In all transactions where 
potential investors put a 
premium on trustworthiness 
and credibility 
62.2 %    60.7 %   76.9 %   45.0 %    57.1 %
(e) In all transactions where 
opposing parties hire highly 
reputed law firms 
44.6 % 53.6 % 42.3 % 35.0 % 42.9 % 
 
  
4. Assuming no conflicts of interest, highly reputed law firms (check all that apply):   
 
 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=72) 
New 
York 
(n=26) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27)  
Chicago 
(n= 19) 
Clients 
(n=16) 
(a) Are as willing to be hired 
for unusual transactions as 
for more typical transactions 
  90.3 %  92.3 %      88.9 % 89.5 %   100.0 %  
(b) Are sometimes reluctant 
to be hired for unusual 
transactions 
8.3 %    7.7 %     11.1 % 5.3 %    0.0 %   
(c) May be biased against 
innovating changes in 
transactions 
9.7 %    3.9 %   14.8 %  10.5 % 12.5 % 
(d) Are not biased against   83.3 %   96.2 %   74.1 %   78.9 %    68.9 %
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innovating changes in the 
transactions 
 
 
5. To what extent, if any, should parties to a transaction trust non-legal information 
provided by another transaction party if that party is represented by a reputable law firm, 
as opposed to where that party is represented only by in-house counsel?:   
 
 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=75) 
New 
York 
(n=28) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients 
(n=17) 
(a) Should trust that 
information much more   
1.3 %   3.6 %      0.0 % 0.0 %     0.0 %  
(b) Should trust that 
information somewhat more 
30.7 %  25.0 %     29.6 %  40.0 %    17.7 %  
(c) Should have no greater 
trust in that information 
68.0 %    71.4%   70.4 % 60.0 %   82.4 % 
 
 
C. Creating Economies of Scope 
 
1.  To what extent could your work on a transaction be performed by a non-lawyer?:   
 
 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=74) 
New 
York 
(n=28) 
Philadelphia 
(n=26) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients 
(n=17) 
(a) To a great extent   0.0 %   0.0 %     0.0 % 0.0 %    5.9 %  
(b) To a significant extent 1.4 %    3.6 %   0.0 % 0.0 %     5.9 %  
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(c) To some extent  45.9 %    39.3 %  50.0 % 50.0 %  58.8 % 
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all 
52.7 % 57.1 % 50.0 % 50.0 % 29.4 % 
 
 
2.  Please briefly describe any non-legal work that falls under this category:    
 
3.  To what extent do you perform that non-legal work simply because someone must, 
and you already are involved in the transaction?: 
 
 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=75) 
New 
York 
(n=28) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients 
(n=15) 
(a) To a great extent 8.0 %    3.6 %      11.1 %  10.0 %   13.3 %  
(b) To a significant extent 22.7 %    28.6 %     14.8 % 25.0 %    13.3 %  
(c) To some extent  28.0 %    21.4 %  25.9 % 40.0 %  33.3 % 
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all 
41.3 % 46.4 % 48.1 % 25.0 % 40.0 % 
 
 
4.  To what extent is that non-legal work necessarily incident to your legal tasks?:   
 
 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=75) 
New 
York 
(n=28) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients 
(n=14) 
(a) To a great extent  24.0 %   32.1 %      22.2 % 15.0 %   0.0 %  
(b) To a significant extent 24.0 %    17.9 %     25.9 %    30.0 % 21.4 %  
(c) To some extent 33.3 %    32.1 %   29.6 %  40.0 %   50.0 %
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(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all 
18.7 % 17.9 % 22.2 % 15.0 % 28.6 % 
 
 
5.  Do you charge at the same rate for that non-legal work?:   
 
 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=71) 
New 
York 
(n=26) 
Philadelphia 
(n=25) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients 
(n=14) 
Yes   90.1 %   96.2 %      84.0%   90.0 %  84.6 %  
No   9.9 %   3.9 %     16.0%    10.0 %  15.4 %  
 
 
6.  Could that non-legal work be performed more efficiently by non-lawyers?:      
 
 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=75) 
New 
York 
(n=28) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27) 
Chicago 
(n=20 ) 
Clients 
(n=17) 
Yes 41.3 %    39.3 %      37.0 % 50.0 %     64.7 %  
No   42.7 %   42.9 %     37.0 % 50.0 %    17.6 %  
Not Answered 16.0 % 17.9 % 26.0 % 0.0 %  17.6 % 
 
 
7.  When negotiating a transaction, to what extent do you actively try to facilitate good 
relationships with opposing counsel?:   
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 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=75) 
New 
York 
(n=28) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients 
(n=16) 
(a) To a great extent   66.7 %  67.9 %      66.7 % 65.0 %   37.5 %  
(b) To a significant extent 28.0 %    28.6 %     22.2 % 35.0 %    31.3 %  
(c) To some extent  5.3 %    3.6 %   11.1 % 0.0 %  31.3 % 
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all 
0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 
 
 
8.  (Question for clients only) To what extent does involving your lawyer in that non-
legal work add value by providing third-party objectivity? 
 
 Clients 
 (n=14) 
(a) To a great extent   0.0 % 
(b) To a significant extent 0.0 %   
(c) To some extent  35.7 % 
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all 
64.3 % 
 
 
D.  Creating Client Privilege and Confidentiality   
 
1.  To what extent do you protect your client by creating an attorney-client privilege?: 
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 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=75) 
New 
York 
(n=28) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients 
(n=16) 
(a) To a great extent  42.7 %   46.4 %      63.0 % 10.0 %     25.0 %  
(b) To a significant extent 24.0 %  17.9 %    11.1 % 50.0 %     43.8 %  
(c) To some extent 29.3 %    25.0 %  25.9 % 40.0 %    31.3 %
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all 
4.0 % 10.7 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 
 
 
2.  To what extent does the attorney-client privilege help facilitate transactions?:   
 
 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=75) 
New 
York 
(n=28) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients 
(n=16) 
(a) To a great extent   12.0 %   7.1 %     25.9 %   0.0 %  12.5 %  
(b) To a significant extent 13.3 %    14.3 %     18.5 %    5.0 %  12.5 %  
(c) To some extent 34.7 %   28.6 %   29.6 %  50.0 %   37.5 %
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all 
40.0 % 50.0 % 25.9 % 45.0 %   37.5 %
(e) The attorney-client 
privilege works against 
facilitating transactions (for 
example, by increasing 
information asymmetry 
among transaction parties) 
1.3 % 3.6 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 
 
 
E.  Reducing Transaction Costs   
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1.  What percentage of your work on a transaction involves preparing, issuing, and/or 
reviewing legal opinions?:   
 
Lawyers  
Overall 
(n=75) 
New York 
(n=28) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients
(n= 16) 
Average  6.47 % 6.10 %  7.56 %   5.53 %  14.6 %
Median 5 %  5 %   5 % 5 %   10.0 %
Standard Deviation  4.80 4.14   6.23  3.08    13.3 
 
 
2.  To what extent are you responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect your client 
against, possible future events that could change your client’s business incentives?:   
 
 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=74) 
New 
York 
(n=27) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients 
(n=17) 
(a) To a great extent   50.0 %   48.2%      51.9 % 50.0 %     41.2 %  
(b) To a significant extent 28.4 %    33.3 %     25.9 % 25.0 %      35.3 %  
(c) To some extent 20.3 %    14.8 %   22.2 % 25.0 %    17.7 %
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all 
1.4 % 3.7 % 0.0 % 0.0 %    5.9 % 
 
 
3.  To what extent are you responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect your client 
against, possible future events that could change the business incentives of other 
transaction parties?:   
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 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=72) 
New 
York 
(n=26) 
Philadelphia 
(n=26) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients 
(n=17) 
(a) To a great extent 25.0 %    26.9 %      34.6 % 10.0 %     29.4 %  
(b) To a significant extent 25.0 %    26.9 %     19.2% 30.0 %     11.8 %  
(c) To some extent 33.3 %    34.6 %   30.8 % 35.0 %  35.3 % 
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all 
16.7 % 11.5 % 15.4 % 25.0 % 23.5 % 
 
 
4.  To what extent do you monitor that your client’s officers act on the client’s behalf?:   
 
 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=75) 
New 
York 
(n=28) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27) 
Chicago 
(n= 20) 
Clients 
(n=16) 
(a) To a great extent   9.3 %   14.3 %      3.7 %  10.0 %    0.0 %  
(b) To a significant extent  24.0 %  21.4 %     25.9 %   25.0 %   6.3 %  
(c) To some extent 36.0 %   32.1 %   40.7 % 35.0 %    31.3 %
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all 
30.7 % 32.1 % 29.6 % 30.0 %   62.5 %
 
 
F.  Reducing Regulatory Costs   
 
1.  To what extent does your work on a transaction actually involve law?:   
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 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=74) 
New 
York 
(n=28) 
Philadelphia 
(n=26) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients 
(n=17) 
(a) To a great extent   23.0 % 21.4 %     19.2 % %   30.0 %   17.7 %  
(b) To a significant extent  70.3 %   75.0 %     65.4 %    70.0 %  58.8 %  
(c) To a small extent 6.8 %     3.6 %   15.4 % 0.0 %    23.5 %
 
 
2.  To what extent are your non-bank transactional clients more regulated by government 
than an ordinary business corporation? 
 
 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=73) 
New 
York 
(n=26) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients 
(n=17) 
(a) To a great extent   8.2%   11.5 %     11.0 %  0.0 %    29.4 %  
(b) To a significant extent   20.5 %   26.9 %     18.5 % 15.0 %     29.4 %  
(c) To a small extent 54.8 %    53.9 %   55.6 % 55.0 %    23.5 %
(d)  Not at all 16.4 % 7.7 % 14.8 % 30.0 %   17.7 %
 
 
3.  When you represent a bank or other regulated entity in a business transaction, to what 
extent do you need to understand the details of that client’s particular regulatory 
concerns?:   
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 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=71) 
New 
York 
(n=27) 
Philadelphia 
(n=26) 
Chicago 
(n=18) 
Clients 
(n=17) 
(a) In detail   32.4 %   33.3 %      42.3 % 16.7 %     47.1 %  
(b) Only sufficiently to know 
when to alert regulatory 
counsel to the possibility of 
legal issues 
56.3 %    63.0 %     34.6 % 77.8 %     52.9 %  
(c) Other 9.9 %     3.7 %  19.2 %  5.6 %   n/a 
 
 
4.  When you represent an ordinary business corporation in a business transaction, which 
of the following statements are true (mark all that are true)?: 
 
 Lawyers 
 Overall 
(n=74) 
New 
York 
(n=27) 
Philadelphia 
(n=27) 
Chicago 
(n=20) 
Clients 
(n=17) 
(a) You need to provide 
expertise in the law and 
regulations that generally 
govern that type of 
transaction 
93.2 %   88.9 %    92.6 %   100.0 %   94.1 %  
(b) You need to understand 
the rationale for the 
contractual provisions in the 
transaction documents 
  97.3 %   100.0 %    96.3 %  95.0 %    88.2 %  
(c) Other 29.7 %    22.2 %  33.3 % 35.0 %    n/a 
 
 
